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The formation of the state is typically seen as the institutional answer that
overcomes the free-rider problem associated with collective goods such as
defence against external enemies. Individuals join in a ‘social contract’, dele-
gate the task of the provision of collective goods to a government and endow
the government with the coercive power to collect the resources necessary
for these public goods. Some writers have discussed the role of agents who
either as monopolists or as competitors, act as providers of protection. Olson
(1993) shows that the monopoly outcome may be an improvement over an
anarchic state, but this need not be the case, particularly if there is a contest
for the position of the enforcer of property rights (Konrad and Skaperdas
1999, Skaperdas 2002, Moselle and Polak 2001).
We contrast these analyses with a framework that is also fully non-
cooperative, but in which a group of players coordinates successfully to
achieve eﬃcient collective actions and an equitable distribution of the to-
tal group revenue among the group members. We show that this outcome
is feasible even though the general conditions for such an outcome are not
very favourable. There is no institution that could grant property rights or
enforce contracts; players interact in a ﬁnite game with complete informa-
tion in a fully non-cooperative context; each player has a technology at his
disposal that can be used to engage in an appropriation contest, and eﬃcient
bargaining is ruled out.
The outcome we describe has several attractive features. First, a fully
eﬃcient ﬁrst-best outcome for the collective goods problem is implemented
in a purely non-cooperative framework. Second, all members of the group
receive some –possibly the same– share in the group’s income. This share
can be seen as a compensation for the member’s contribution to collective
action, but is not part of a formal contract and is paid in a way that does
not involve any promise or commitment by the recipient. Third, group size
is meaningful. Larger groups are more eﬀective in their defence activities.
Increasing returns in group size emerges endogenously from the assumption
that each individual player’s cost of defence eﬀort is convex in own eﬀort.
Fourth, despite these increasing returns, there is an optimal group size that
maximizes the group members’ returns per capita. Fifth, the framework
oﬀers an explanation for why some clans, groups, or states perform very
well whereas others perform very badly. The analysis provides an exam-
ple of the functioning, importance and implicit enforcement of norms: the
4implementation of the eﬃcient collective action requires all players to have
a common view about their appropriate contribution to the collective good
and an appropriate or equitable distribution of rents. Deviation from these
norms by a single player may induce a shift from one equlibrium to another,
less attractive one.
In the economic literature, early contributions by Nitzan (1991) and Davis
and Reilly (1999) consider the implications of diﬀerent rules governing a
peaceful distribution of resources inside the group for the willingness of group
members to make voluntary contributions to group eﬀort. These rules and
the peacefulness of distribution inside the group are taken as given in these
frameworks. Their work shows from a group perspective the importance of
merit rules as incentive instruments. Work by Katz and Tokatlidu (1996),
W¨ arneryd (1998) and M¨ uller and W¨ arneryd (2001) highlights that peace-
ful allocation rules inside the group cannot be taken for granted. Their
work focuses on the role of hierarchies of conﬂict, with a conﬂict between
groups, followed by a conﬂict among the members of the victorious group
for the amount of overall resources spent on appropriation eﬀort in the equi-
librium.1 This literature takes as given that a peaceful settlement is not
feasible, or that the cost of eﬀort emerges in terms of building up threats for
an upcoming conﬂict which may then be settled. Hence, players may have to
spend and sacriﬁce resources, either by building up a threat, or in the actual
conﬂict. Most recently, the aim of contributions by Falkinger (2006) and
S´ anchez-Pag´ es and Straub (2006) is to explain the endogenous emergence of
norm enforcement institutions by agents’ voluntary costly contributions to
their formation. They assume an enforcement technology as given. While
Falkinger (2006) does not perform a game-theoretic analysis, S´ anchez-Pag´ es
and Straub (2006) analyse subgame perfect equilibria of a repeated game
with strong - exogenously given - commitment power of agents. In contrast,
our analysis strictly applies non-cooperative game theory in order to explain
the emergence of cooperative peaceful behavior within a group or clan. The
absence of any coordinating devices (like enforcement institutions) results
in a multiplicity of equilibria, all of which have in common that a “peace
dividend” is distributed among clan members in a conﬂict-free way.
In political science there has been careful discussion of whether, and how,
1This structure has been studied further by Glazer (2002) who discusses the cost and
beneﬁt of group members who are highly eﬃcient ﬁghters. They beneﬁt the group in the
conﬂict with rival groups, but they also appropriate a larger share in whatever the group
wins.
5violent conﬂict can or cannot be avoided in the context of the theory of ra-
tional approaches to studying war. From this literature it turns out (see,
e.g., Fearon 1995) that problems of asymmetric information and commit-
ment problems are the keys to explaining why conﬂict may take place, de-
spite its obvious ineﬃciency compared to a peaceful settlement. However,
as explained by Slantchev (2003), multiplicity of equilibrium and diﬀerences
in the desirability of reaching one or other equilibrium, together with ex-
pectations about which action triggers which equilibrium may lead to actual
conﬂict. Conceptually, Slantchev’s analysis is closest to ours. We use the
fact that multiple equilibria may exist with respect to the internal order of
a clan or state. Diﬀerent histories, hence, may lead to diﬀerent equilibria,
and this may induce individuals to overcome the free-riding incentives. They
may choose eﬃcient collective action, both with respect to the formation of
military force to defend the group against outside enemies and with respect
to a consensual distribution of the group income in a fully non-cooperative
way, because this history of choices may trigger a collectively more attractive
equilibrium.
2 The analytic framework
Consider a group, or clan that consists of a set N of n members. They
interact with an outside enemy in an external conﬂict, and they interact
inside.
We ﬁrst study interaction inside. The members need to solve the problem
of how to share the clan’s income between them. One may think of the prize
as an amount of a homogenous and universal good, or simply an amount
of money, whose size we normalize to V = 1. The clan members may ﬁght
about this amount or settle. However, as all clan members are endowed with
the means to ﬁght about resources, any contractual relationships or simple
bargaining concepts that also require commitment to some bargaining rules2
2If violent means for appropriation are available, even ‘non-cooperative’ bargaining
requires a considerable amount of commitment: the acceptance of certain rules, the com-
mitment abstain from using other, more violent, means of appropriation during the nego-
tiations, or ex post, once a mutually agreed deal is struck and the surplus is divided. Why
rational agents use violence in a conﬂict instead of negotiating peacefully has ben anal-
ysed most carefully in international politics (see Fearon (1995) for an overview.) Slantchev
(2003) highlights the views of Clausewitz and of Schelling on war. They consider war itself
as a bargaining process.
6are ruled out as a settlement outcome. The outcome is determined in a
fully non-cooperative framework in which players can, and may, use eﬀort in
trying to appropriate the prize for themselves in a contest where the amount
of appropriation eﬀort chosen by the players determines the allocation of the
prize.
The internal governance structure is anticipated when the clan has the
opportunity to acquire, or faces the threat of losing, some amount of income
in a contest with an external enemy. In this external conﬂict the clan mem-
bers must decide about their contribution to the total military eﬀort. We
turn to this external conﬂict having solved the internal allocation problem
to which we turn now.
3 Inside the clan
Consider a clan that owns some income V = 1, for instance, as a result
of winning an external conﬂict with an enemy. The allocation of this prize
among its members is governed as follows. A conﬂict technology determines
who receives the income.3 Each clan member i can choose eﬀort xi,a n d
the income is awarded to the player who spends the highest eﬀort. More
formally, let M denote the set of clan members j for which xj ≥ xk for all
k ∈ N, and let #M be the number of members in M. The probability that
j wins the conﬂict is a function of all contestants’ eﬀorts, and is denoted as
pi = pi(x1,x 2,...xn)=
1
#M
if i ∈ M and pi = 0 otherwise. (1)
The process that eventually leads to this allocation follows a game with
several stages. In a ﬁrst stage, G1, one designated player 1 is allowed to
distribute non-negative payments (a2,a 3,...an) to the other group members.
We denote




This player owns suﬃcient resources to make these payments, where aj ∈
[0,V] can be assumed without restricting generality. We call player 1 the
3The all-pay auction describes the limiting case of a very broad class of allocation rules
that describe the the outcome of a contest in which a given group of players ﬁght about
how to distribute a given rent among themselves. It has been used in many contexts and
compared to other contest success functions, has nice properties that simplify the analysis.
7clan leader. Payments take place at stage G1, and are fully unconditional:
members who receive a payment do not, and cannot, promise anything in
exchange for the payment, and simply follow their own narrow interests in
subsequent decision making. These payments also do not alter the set of
possible actions to be taken by any clan member in the future. For sim-
plicity, we assume that these payments are public information; all payments
are observed by all members.4 Note, however, that payments can change
the behavior of a player who is indiﬀerent about his own future actions, or
change players’ expectations if there are multiple equilibria in the contin-
uation game. The payments may therefore drive the selection between a
peaceful equilibrium and violent ﬁghts inside the clan.
In stage G2, each member decides about the timing of his own eﬀort
choice, building on Baik and Shogren (1992), Baik (1994, 2005) and Leininger
(1993). There are two diﬀerent points in time, early (e) and late (l). Each
clan member must decide whether to make his eﬀort choice at one of these
points of time; early or late. If he chooses e, he cannot reduce or increase
his eﬀort choice at a later point in time l. Hence, clan members who choose
e give members who choose l the opportunity to react to their eﬀort choices.
Members who choose e are Stackelberg leaders with respect to all who choose
l.5
In stage G3, the point in time e is reached. At this point all observe their
own and others’ choices of timing.6 Anyone who decided to make his eﬀort
4This is mainly to be able to continue with a game with complete information. For the
sake of the argument, it would be suﬃcient if each clan member observed his own aj.
5To illustrate, consider a clan which receives some amount of outside income which is
contested among clan members, but in which each clan member also owns and tills his own
piece of land. Let each clan member have two units of time, say, two months, before the
winter season starts. He needs one month for tilling the ground, leaving him at most one
month’s time to spend on engaging in intra-group conﬂict (e.g., he may literally produce
weapons or spend time to conspire with others, or to persuade others etc.). A clan member
who does not till his ground in the ﬁrst month will need to do this in the second month,
as otherwise he sacriﬁces one year’s return on his land, so he is commited not to spend
his time on arming in the second month. A clan member who uses the ﬁrst month for
tilling the ground, commits to a late choice of contest eﬀort, as he can choose how much
of the second month to use to spend on contest eﬀort. As will turn out, the contestants
who choose e will not spend eﬀort. Hence, in more general terms, the choice of e can be
seen as a player’s choice to delay unavoidable activities to the late period, preventing him
from using this time in the late period for contest eﬀort.
6Note that this assumption is not needed. For the results in Proposition 1 to hold it
is necessary only that the choice of e or l becomes common knowledge among all clan
8choice at e chooses his xi simultaneously with all others who made this same




Clan members can, but need not, be symmetric. Generally we will assume
that they may diﬀer with respect to their cost of generating contest eﬀort,
and consider them sorted and numbered such that c1 ≤ c2 ≤ ... ≤ cn.N o t e
that this together with the description of stage G1 implies that the leader
has the lowest cost of contest eﬀort.7
In stage G4, the point of time l is reached. All observe the eﬀort choices
made by clan members who made this choice at time e. All others now decide
simultaneously about their own eﬀorts. The cost of a given amount of eﬀort
is the same whether chosen at e or at l and is described by the quadratic
cost function (3). Recall that members who chose time e cannot revise their
eﬀort choices at time l. Once all eﬀort choices are made, the prize is allocated
according to the contest success function (1), and this constitutes stage G5
and has already been outlined.
The following lemma describes the equilibrium of the subgame starting
in stage G3.
Lemma 1 The subgame starting at stage G3 has unique equilibrium pay-
oﬀs for any given choices tj ∈{ e,l}. Payoﬀs are characterized as follows:













j=2 aj if t1 = l and
if tj = l for some j =2 ,...n





j=2 aj if t1 = e
(5)
The result is proven in Konrad and Leininger (2005), who combine and
extend results of Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1996) and Kaplan, Luski and
Wettstein (2003). Intuitively, if t1 = l and tj = e for all j =2 ,...n, then it
members prior to l, which is consistent with the idea that a choice of e essentially means
that a player delays mandatory duties to the future, and hence, commits to not using this
future time for producing contest eﬀort.
7Our results can be generalized to other cost functions than (3), but we constrain the
analysis to this parametric case because it yields simple closed form solutions and allows
for a simple ordering in terms of group members’ eﬀort costs.
9makes no sense for j to spend positive eﬀort, as any eﬀort that costs j less
than the value of the prize will be overbid by player 1 in the last round. Player
1 wins without any signiﬁcant eﬀort and his payoﬀ equals the value of the
prize, minus his unconditional payments from stage G1. Moreover, players
2,...n receive nothing but the unconditional payment aj. This explains the
ﬁrst line in (5). A similar argument applies whenever player 1 chooses t1 = l.
All players who choose tj = e will not spend positive eﬀort, because they
cannot win a positive payoﬀ by any positive eﬀort choice. However, player
1 will be in a contest with other players who also chose tj = l.G i v e n
xj = 0 by all players who choose tj = e, the contest essentially reduces to a
simultaneous contest among the group of players k who chose tk = l. The
equilibrium outcome of this simultaneous contest is well known. Only the two
players with the lowest cost parameter bid positive eﬀort, which is player 1
and player jmin. The equilibrium is in mixed strategies, and some of the prize
will be dissipated. For quadratic cost,
c1
cjmin
is the share that is dissipated.
Finally, if player 1 chooses t1 = e, one can distinguish two cases. If j =2
chooses tj = l, then the player 1 with the lowest cost can pre-empt player
2 by a suﬃciently high bid x1 = 1 √
c2, which just yields the payoﬀ (1 −
c1
c2).
If, instead, j =2c h o o s e stj = e, then things are more complicated and the
equilibrium strategies take into account that players with tk = l may overbid
low eﬀort levels, but the same intuition gets through: j = 2 is the main
competitor for player 1 and induces a dissipation equal to
c1
c2. In particular,
j = 1 can always attain at least (1−
c1
c2) by a choice x1 =1 /
√
c2 , as no other
player will ever reasonably choose a higher eﬀort. This limits his payoﬀ from
below, and, with some formal eﬀort, one can also show that this also limits his
eﬀort from above (see Konrad and Leininger (2005)). Obviously, the bidding
of players at the second stage l can be interpreted as an all-pay auction with
a minimal bid requirement (namely, submit at least a bid as high as the
highest bid from stage e). Perhaps surprisingly, bidding in the ﬁrst stage l
also reduces to an all-pay auction with a minimal bid requirement (namely,
submit at least a bid as high as the highest individually rational bid of the
player with the least cost, who moves at l).
Note that all players j =2 ,...n are fully indiﬀerent with respect to their
choice of timing. Their overall payoﬀ is equal to the unconditional payment
aj, and their payoﬀ from participating in the contest is zero in expectation
and independent of their timing. Their choices matter for player 1’s payoﬀ,
and if he could inﬂuence their behavior, he would have a strictly positive
10willingness to pay for making them choose tj = e. Of course, any such
contractual relationship between the group members has been ruled out,
as we study strictly non-cooperative outcomes in an environment without
any contracts that require commitment, and without tacit collusion through
repeated interaction.
Consider now stage G2.
Lemma 2 For player 1 the choice of t1 = l is a weakly dominant decision
in the following sense:
i) For any timing decicisions t−1 =( t2,...,tn) by players 2 to n there is a
subgame perfect equilibrium of the full game with t∗ =( l,t2,...,tn)
ii) For any t−1 =( e,t3,...,tn) the decision t1 = l is the unique equilibrium
choice of player 1.
The proof of Lemma 2 follows from Proposition 2 in Konrad and Leininger
(2005).
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 together suggest that the continuation game
consisting of stages G2-G4 has at least 2n−1 equilibria. In each of these
equilibria player 1 chooses t1 = l, but this choice can go along with any
combination (t2,...,tn) by the other players. The payoﬀ for player j, with
j ∈{ 2,...,n},i saj for all equilibria. The payoﬀ for player 1 is highest
and equal to 1 −
 n





j=2 aj,i f( t2,...,tn)=( l,t3,...,tn). Note, that player 1 is indiﬀerent
between t1 = e and t1 = l if t2 = l; hence there are also equilibria in which
player 1 chooses e, but these do not lead to new equilibrium payoﬀ vectors.
In contrast, each of the players j =2 ,...n is fully indiﬀerent with respect
to his own choice of timing and the choice of timing by all other players.
The choice of timing tj can therefore depend on any event or action that is
observable at the beginning of G2; for instance on the payments made to
group members. We denote this relationship as
tj = τj(a2,a 3,...an). (6)
Here, τj can be a trivial or non-trivial function of these payments. The
particular function τj determines which of the continuation equilibria in G2−
G4 is chosen.
Proposition 1 Deﬁne A≡{(a2,...an)|a<
c1
c2 and aj ≥ 0 for j =2 ,...n}.
Then, for any a ∈A , there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game,
in which player 1 chooses a at the ﬁrst stage.
11Proof. Let t1 ≡ l, but
τj(a)=
 
e if a = a∗
l if a  = a∗
By Lemmas 1 and 2, this behavior yields πj = aj for all j =2 ,...n in the
subgame perfect equilibrium, independent of j s choice of timing, and payoﬀ
π1 =1− a∗ if a = a∗ and π1 =1−
c1
c2 − a otherwise. Player 1 maximizes his
payoﬀ by a = a∗ if a∗ ≤
c1
c2,a n db ya =( 0 ,0,...0) if a∗ >
c1
c2.
Groups may overcome the problem of wasteful internal ﬁghts about the
distribution of the group income between its members in a fully non-cooperative
game without repeated interaction, without reputation building, and with-
out relying on the rules of a non-cooperative bargaining game. This peaceful
equilibrium is compatible with a large number of distributions of the group
income. The leader receives at least what he could obtain from ﬁghting, and
any division of the ‘peace dividend’
c1
c2 is compatible with Proposition 1.8
The discussion of the clan members’ eﬀorts to make the clan receive the
rent in the external conﬂict that is allocated among the clan members sub-
sequently, will yield some further constraints on the feasible allocation of the
clan’s income. These constraints will result from a strictly non-cooperative
analysis, but will still resemble some regime in which clan members receive
transfers that are related to their ‘merit’.
Note that Proposition 1 implicitly assumed that the leadership role was
assigned to the player who is the strongest ﬁghter, as c1 = minj∈N{cj}.A
player j with cj >c 1 cannot perform the leadership role. If he were to make
positive transfers a>0, he could never retrieve them. His payoﬀ from the
intra-group contest in any equilibrium would be 0. Hence any sort of leader-
ship contest would see player 1 prevail. The sequencing of timing decisions
has two eﬀects: it not only yields equilibria in pure strategies, but also an
“eﬃciency gain” if players move in an appropriate order. The latter eﬀect
relies on the possibility that the strongest player can use his greater strength
against weaker players through their expectations (i.e. without having to
exert it) if he moves late (and the others early). If he moves early (or others
join him in moving late), he actually has to exert his greater strength by
8This indeterminacy is not uncommon, of course, in other contexts, e.g., the cake-eating
problem. The main diﬀerence is that we do not make any assumption about procedural
rules that the players agree to, and explicitly allow for resource wasteful appropriation
eﬀort here.
12making the largest eﬀort bid. This seriously limits the leadership potential
of any player other than the strongest.
4 Collective action
The formation of clans, groups or states has a purpose - the provision of
collective goods. One of the quintessential public goods problems is the col-
lective provision of eﬀort to defend the clan’s territory, or to expand this
territory at the expense of rivals or enemies. Returns to scale, or the impor-
tance of country size for relative strength in international conﬂict, has been
one of the key drivers of a process of consolidation and the formation of ever
larger units. Riker (1966, pp. 2-3, 8-9) emphasizes military considerations as
central for the formation of federations, and illustrates this using examples
starting from the federation of city states in Ancient Greece. The theory
of the optimal size of nations by Spolaore and Alesina (2002) attributes the
recent breakup of larger nation states to the decline in the importance of
international military conﬂict in most modern, post cold-war times.
In an environment with conﬂict between nations, larger units acquire
smaller units and grow in strength, and there seems to be a natural tendency
for a monopoly of force, unless there are counteracting forces, for instance
the problem of internal cohesion and problems of internal coordination and
communication. We will ﬁrst consider the potential for collective action for
a clan of given size. The optimal size of clans is discussed in a later section.
The ‘external’ conﬂict Consider the competition between the clan and
an enemy for a prize that can again be seen as an amount of resources, e.g.,
money or some homogenous universal good that is valued at V = 1. The
contest follows the rules of an all-pay auction similar to the rules of the
possible intra-clan conﬂict. Let yE be the total contest eﬀort chosen by the




Further, let each clan member decide on his own contribution yj to the clan’s




13The use of the same cj in (3) and (8) is mainly for notational parsimony.
Clan members may diﬀer in their relative abilities for internal and external
ﬁghts, but often these abilities should be expected to be positively correlated.





This is a special case of more general technology determining the public good
as a function of individual contributions, yC = yC(y1,...yn). However, free
riding incentives are particularly strong in this the case of perfect substi-
tutability as in (9), this case dominates in the literature on private provision
of public goods9, and our mechanism for implementing eﬃcient contributions
can easily be adapted to a whole class of other functions.10
The contest between the clan and the enemy is again governed by the
same type of contest success function: the clan or the enemy wins the prize,
depending on who spends higher eﬀort. A fair coin decides who wins the
prize if yC = yE.
From the perspective of member i, any contribution yi to the aggregate
level of yC is a contribution to a clan-wide pure public good. We ﬁrst de-
termine what the combinations of eﬀort (y1,...yn) are that are collectively
optimal from the perspective of the clan. Then we show that this collectively
optimal behavior can be implemented as a fully non-cooperative equilibrium,
taking into consideration that the prize must be allocated among the clan
members if the clan wins the prize, and that this involves some intra-clan
conﬂict as studied in the previous section.
Optimal collective eﬀort in the inter-group conﬂict Suppose that
the clan manages to coordinate on a peaceful equilibrium once it wins the
9McGuire (1974) introduced this setup when studying collective action. The seminal
paper using this technology is Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986). For the case with
contribution substitutability but convex individual contribution cost see Esteban and Ray
(2001). For further discussion and a survey see Batina and Ihori (2005).
10Other technologies are Hirshleifer’s (1983) ”weakest link” model with yC =
min(y1,...,yn), or the ”best shot” model with yC = max(y1,...,yn), or the case of a
discontinuous public good such that the public good is provided if and only if the sum
of contributions exceeds a given threshold as in Bagnoli and Lipman (1989). In some of
these cases an eﬃcient non-cooperative outcome exists already if there is no threat of an
intra-group conﬂict.
14prize. In this case, the clan collectively values the prize by its nominal
value, which we normalized to V = 1. The optimal choice of the clan’s
eﬀort yC will generally depend on the enemy’s choice of eﬀort. However, the
following proposition determines how a given amount of aggregate eﬀort can
be generated in an eﬀort cost minimizing way.
Proposition 2 If the clan generates a given amount of aggregate eﬀort y in
a cost minimizing way, the clan’s aggregate eﬀort cost is equal to
DC(y)=cy







Proof. The cost function DC(y) of the clan is obtained as the solution to the





























Integrating and taking into consideration that DC(0) = 0 yields (10).
Note that c as deﬁned in (10) decreases if the clan grows by an additional
member. This monotonicity holds whatever the current size of the clan and
the combination of cost parameters is. The size and the distribution of cost
determines the size of the change in c. Large clans have a lower cost of a given
amount of eﬀort in an external conﬂict if this amount of eﬀort is eﬃciently
provided: if there are more clan members, each member needs to contribute
a smaller portion of the given clan eﬀort, and, with increasing marginal cost,
the aggregate cost is decreasing in the number of clan members.
Also note that the cost parameter c of the clan cost function DC(y)e q u a l s
1









This is a technological source of feasible “eﬃciency gains” for the clan beyond
the leader’s strength. These gains increase in n and the strength of any new
member of the clan. The fact that eﬃcient ‘cost sharing’ among clan members
with quadratic individual cost functions in the provision of clan eﬀort leads
to the “per capita harmonic mean” of these cost functions as the clan cost
function is of independent interest.
Propostion 2 means that clan member j has to contribute eﬀort y∗
j(y)=
c
cjy at individual cost c2
cjy in the eﬃcient provision of clan eﬀort y. I.e. all
members have to contribute and stronger members have to contribute more
than weaker members.
The lower cost translates into an advantage in the external conﬂict with
an enemy if the clan can manage to mobilize each member to contribute the
eﬃcient amount of eﬀort. Let the clan maximize
πC(y)=FE(y) − DC(y)=Prob(yE <y ) − DC(y)( 1 2 )
and, similarly, the enemy maximize,
πE(y)=FC(y) − DE(y)=Prob(yC <y ) − DE(y). (13)
Then the following holds:
Proposition 3 Consider the all-pay auction between the clan and an enemy
for a prize which they both value at 1. If the clan can choose its aggregate
eﬀort eﬃciently in order to maximize (12), this payoﬀ is
π
∗




A proof relies on the standard result of an all-pay auction between two
contestants with the same valuations of winning and quadratic cost functions
(7) and (10).
The proposition shows that the clan can win a positive payoﬀ in the
wasteful conﬂict with the enemy if
cE >c . (14)
This condition deﬁnes the potential superiority of the clan in the conﬂict
with the enemy. As c depends on the number and cost distribution of clan
members, this superiority is endogenous with respect to the composition of
the clan.
16Equilibrium collective action Can the clan members non-cooperatively
coordinate on the eﬃcient collective action? What are the conditions that
must hold for such a coordination to be feasible or likely? How does this
ability or possibility depend on the size of the clan, on the internal structure
of the clan, the distribution of cost and on the clan’s ability to distribute any
clan income peacefully among its members? These are the questions we turn
to now.
The external conﬂict takes place in a stage W(ar). As discussed above,
if the clan and its enemy choose their eﬀorts yC and yE in order to maxi-
mize their respective payoﬀs, the equilibrium is in mixed strategies in which
the eﬀort choices are drawn from random variables with cumulative density
functions FC and FE, respectively. Eﬃcient provision of a given eﬀort level
yC by the clan requires a particular, unique allocation of eﬀorts, (y1,...,yn),
among its members. If yC is a draw from a random distribution, it is there-
fore important for eﬃciency that the individual eﬀort choices and the choice
of yC are perfectly correlated. In order to make this feasible, we allow for
the following coordination device. Some number θ is chosen as the outcome





0f o r θ ≤ 0
cEθ2 for θ ∈ (0, 1 √
cE)
1f o rθ ≥ 1 √
cE.
(15)
This θ is observed by all clan members (but not by the enemy) before they
freely and simultaneously make their individual eﬀort choices yj. Once all
clan members and the enemy have chosen their eﬀorts, θ and all eﬀort choices
are observed by all players. The clan wins the prize if yC >y E, and the enemy
wins if yC <y E. Each of them wins with probability 1/2 if yC = yE.I ft h e
enemy wins, the game is over, as the clan does not receive a rent to ﬁght
about internally .
If the clan wins, then the clan members enter into stages G1-G5 as dis-
cussed in the section on internal conﬂict.
Proposition 4 Let the clan be potentially superior to the enemy in the sense
of (14). If c1 − c2 is suﬃciently close to zero, then a subgame perfect equi-
librium exists in which the clan can implement the externally eﬃcient eﬀorts
and a peaceful distribution of rents from war.
17Proof. Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 characterize the equilibria of the subgames
consisting of stages G2-G5. Each clan member except the leader is indiﬀerent
whether to choose tj = e or tj = l. The choices and the equilibrium of G2-G5
can therefore depend on the history of the game at the beginning of G2. At
G2, a history consists of a θ, choices of eﬀorts in the inter-group conﬂict by
the clan members, (y1,...yn), an eﬀort choice by the enemy, yE, an outcome
of the contest in which the clan wins the prize, and a vector of unconditional
transfers (a2,...,an) that was chosen and paid by the leader in stage G1.
Hence,
ti = τi(θ,y1,...yn,y E,a 2,...an)
replaces (6).
Consider the following candidate choice of timing in the continuation
equilibrium at G2 as a function of the history up to this point,
t =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
(l,e,e,...,e)
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
for the class of histories with
yj(θ)= c
cjθ ≡ y∗
j(θ) for all j
and a = a∗ with
a∗
j ≥ c2




(l,l,l,...,l) for any other history that reaches G2,
(16)
and the equilibrium payoﬀs determined by these choices as characterized in
Proposition 1. To conﬁrm that (16) can induce an eﬃcient subgame-perfect
equilibrium of the overall game, consider ﬁrst G1 which is reached if the clan
was victorious in the external conﬂict.
If at least one clan member deviated from y∗
j(θ), then t =( l,l,...l), in-
dependent of a. Accordingly, the leader chooses a =( 0 ,0,...,0) in this case,




1 for j =1a n d
−cjy2
j for j =2 ,...n.
(17)
If all clan members have chosen y∗
j(θ), the leader’s choice of a determines





c2 − a − c1(y∗
1(θ))2and
πj − cj(y∗
j(θ))2 = aj − cj(y∗
j(θ))2 for j =2 ,...n,
18and, among these transfer payments, the clan leader’s payoﬀ is maximal for
a =( 0 ,0,...,0). Alternatively, the leader can choose a = a∗. This yields
payoﬀs
1 − a∗ − c1(y∗
1(θ))2 for j =1a n d
a∗
j − cj(y∗
j(θ))2 for j =2 ,...n.
The leader chooses a∗ if c1
c2
− a
∗ ≥ 0. (18)














is the enemy’s optimal reply to F ∗
C(y)=F(θ)a sa n yyE ∈ [0, 1 √
cE) yields
the enemy an expected payoﬀ of zero and higher eﬀort yE yields negative
expected payoﬀ.
Taking F ∗
E and the equilibrium eﬀort choices y∗
k(θ) of all other clan mem-
bers k  = j as given, j  = 1 chooses between y∗








j(θ){−cj(yj)2} = 0. The latter makes use of aj =0i fyj(θ)  =
y∗
j(θ), and of j’s payoﬀ from the actual intra-clan conﬂict being zero for j  =1 .
The two possible candidates for an optimum are yj =0o ryj = y∗
j(θ). y∗
j(θ)
is chosen if −cj(y∗
j(θ))2 + FE(θ)a∗















.( 1 9 )
Taking F ∗
E and the equilibrium eﬀort choices y∗
j(θ)o fa l lj  = 1 as given,
j = 1 chooses between y∗








which is his payoﬀ in the eﬃcient equilibrium in the intra-clan contest which








1 − y1))(1 −
c1
c2
)( 2 0 )
19The characterization of the payoﬀ (20) uses the fact the deviation from y∗
1(θ)
will induce a = 0 and the equilibrium with violent intra-clan conﬂict. The
choice problem of the leader therefore reduces to the choice between y∗
1(θ)=
c
c1θ and argmaxy1 =y∗
1(θ){−c1y2
1 +( ( 1− c
cE)+c(θ − c
c1θ + y1)2)(1 −
c1
c2)}.F o r
c2 − c1 → 0, the argument that maximizes (20) is y1 = 0 and yields zero
payoﬀ. Accordingly, the candidate equilibrium eﬀort y1 = y∗
1(θ)i sc h o s e ni f
−c1(y∗
1(θ))2+F ∗



















+cθ2) is monotonically increasing in θ, the condition (21) is strongest
for θ = 1 √

























cj > 0, or, equivalently, 1 − c
cE > 0,
which is identical with the condition of potential superiority.
Potential superority of the clan is one prerequisite from the external con-
ﬂict structure for sustainability of the eﬃcient eﬀort in equilibrium. Another
prerequisite from the internal conﬂict structure is limited potential superior-
ity of the leader inside the clan. A strong “deputy” player 2 of the leader 1
not only increases competitiveness in the external contest, but also poses a
larger threat (see (20)) in the internal contest, which stabilizes the eﬃcient
equilibrium.
The case c1 = c2 is an interesting benchmark case. The incentives to
coordinate on the peaceful outcome are largest here; coordination is feasible
at, and in the neighborhood of this benchmark case. Intuitively, at c1 = c2,
if coordination fails, the leader does not receive a positive payoﬀ even if the
clan wins the prize in the external conﬂict, and his incentives to pursue a
“stand alone” strategy in which he cheats on eﬀort in the external conﬂict,
20and then also does not make positive transfers, are minimal, because his
payoﬀ in the resulting ﬁghting equilibrium is zero. The opposite benchmark
case is obtained if c1 << c2,a n dc ≈ cE. In this case the leader does not
gain much from coordinated action, as the overall prize the clan wins from
coordinated action is negligible. It turns out that the eﬃcient coordinated
equilibrium cannot be supported for all cost parameter values. This is shown
for a numerical example in Appendix A .
Proposition 4 characterizes rules for contributions to the collective action
and transfers from the leader to the followers that serve as a norm.I f a l l
players obey the norm, the outcome is eﬃcient from the perspective of the
group. Moreover, all players have an incentive to obey the norm. The norm is
also self-enforcing. If the norm is not obeyed by some player, this simply leads
to a diﬀerent subgame perfect equilibrium which is inferior to the equilibrium
in the subgame chosen if the norm is obeyed.
Many other norms can also be sustained as an equilibrium by the fact that
the players can reach the peaceful equilibrium only if they obey the norm.
These norms may support an equilibrium in which the behavior of the clan
members is suboptimal from the clan perspective. An example would be to
replace y∗
j(θ)= c
cjθ by some y∗
j = c
cjθ +δ for suﬃciently small δ. This choice
makes the clan win the contest with probability 1 (and leads to a diﬀerent
optimal reply by the enemy). It also causes some excessive eﬀort cost. But,
if δ is small, and if this behavior is a necessary condition for coordinating
on the peaceful equilibrium, this ineﬃcient norm can be sustained. This
reproduces an important property of norms. Norms are excessively stable
in the sense that they may become obsolete or inferior to some alternative
norm but may still continue to be obeyed.
We turn to the comparative static properties of the result in Proposition
4n o w .
First, the clan cannot do better using a commitment on even higher eﬀort.
F ∗
C(θ) is the optimal reply to F ∗
E of a player who values winning the prize by
V = 1 and has a cost parameter c<c E.11
Second, there are further equilibria. Note, however, that this is not our
key question. The key question was whether what is eﬃcient for the clan can
be implemented as the outcome of fully non-cooperative interaction.
11The clan could improve upon the equilibrium outcome if it could make it credible that
it values winning the prize by more than V = 1, as this induces a diﬀerent, less aggressive,
equilibrium response by the enemy.
21Third, the distribution of cost functions inside the clan is important, but
the number of clan members also matters. Consider, for instance, a given cE











a suﬃciently large clan exists such that cE >c , making the payoﬀ of the clan
in the peaceful non-cooperative equilibrium that is characterized in Proposi-
tion 4 strictly positive.
5 Optimal clan size
Would clan members prefer an ever larger clan, or is there an optimal n for
given cE? An answer to this question depends on the cost structure of clans,
and also on the norm about the equilibrium transfer payments a∗. We focus
on the particular case in which the cost parameter is the same for all clan
members, i.e., cj = c0 for all j =1 ,2,...n. If all clan members have the same
parameter cj in their cost of ﬁghting eﬀort, this constitutes the strongest
clan with n members that a leader with individual cost parameter c1 = c0
can assemble. Its clan cost function is characterized by a cost parameter
c =
c0
n . Any clan with the same number of members, but with cj <c 0 for
some clan members, has a higher cost of ﬁghting. Moreover, for cj = c0 for all
j, internal distributional ﬁghting is easiest to contain, because the sacriﬁce
from actual internal ﬁghting is largest.
Egalitarian clans With identical cost structures for all members, each
member contributes the same amount of eﬀort to the external conﬂict. If
the distribution is egalitarian, each member receives the same share in the
payoﬀ. We call this case egalitarian. Let cj = c0 = const. for all j =
1,2,...n, and assume that the incentive compatibility constraints (18), (19)
and (22) are fulﬁlled for symmetric payments aj = 1
n. This is the case if the
clan is potentially superior to the enemy: (18) holds trivially, and (19) and
(22) coincide and reduce to potential superiority of the clan. The size that









22where, for homogenous clans, c = c0/n. The ﬁrst-order condition can be





.( 2 3 )
This result is stated as a proposition:
Proposition 5 Consider a homogenous and egalitarian clan. The number of
clan members that maximizes the individual member’s payoﬀ in the eﬃcient
equilibrium is described by (23).
The condition (23) states that the size of n is chosen that reduces the







Everyday life experience tells us that if individual members of a group do not
do their “duty”, this can easily upset the other members, and can upset the
peaceful regime that may otherwise prevail inside the group. If the norms
about social behavior within the group are violated by some group members
not contributing what is considered their appropriate share of contributions
to the common interest, this may induce other members of the group to
reconsider given predispositions of intra-group distribution of resources and
may cause quarrelling among the group members. Such quarrelling dissi-
pates resources and is collectively disadvantageous. In turn, anticipation of
quarrelling as an outcome of neglecting own duties may give the group mem-
bers an incentive to behave. Hence, the fear of possible ﬁghting and resource
wasting conﬂict inside the group may stabilize an eﬃcient outcome in which
group members voluntarily contribute to group speciﬁc public goods.
In this paper we provide a microeconomic underpinning for this mech-
anism within a strictly non-cooperative framework and within a framework
with a ﬁnite horizon. Multiple equilibria can exist with respect to the distri-
bution of resources within the group, some of which are peaceful and others
are characterized by resource wasting conﬂict. If the selection of equilibrium
is driven by the group members’ conduct with respect to their contributions
to a group speciﬁc public good, this can induce fully eﬃcient voluntary con-
tributions to the public good. This is the key result of the paper.
23The general mechanism analysed here works equally well for contribu-
tions to many group speciﬁc public goods. More speciﬁcally, we considered
contributions to protecting the group against other rival groups, or contribu-
tions of eﬀort in a resource wasting conﬂict between this and another group.
It turned out that one group member may perform the role as leader. The
leader distributes gifts among the group members. We identify a reason why
the role as leader should be performed by the strongest group member. We
also ﬁnd that groups are stronger if they are homogenous, and we ﬁnd that
an interior group size is optimal.
One main diﬀerence between our framework and many other consider-
ations and possible solutions that are oﬀered for overcoming the collective
action problem is the strictly non-cooperative nature of our framework. We
do not rely on the folk theorem of inﬁnitely repeated games. We do not as-
sume that group members play cooperatively in the future only if they make
the appropriate public good contributions now. We also do not assume that
the group collectively manages to empower a government that punishes group
members who do not contribute their share. Such an assumption leaves open
the question of how the group members are protected from this government
which may abuse its power and extort from the group members if it is made
suﬃciently powerful. Such an assumption would also leave open the question
of how costly punishment can be enforced. Instead, we consider a framework
for which each and every decision is made fully non-cooperatively, and in
which any future individual action is sequentially rational. Punishment for
norm disobedience is self-enforcing as disobedience triggers the selection of
an equilibrium which involves lower payoﬀs, whereas obedience triggers the
selection of a superior non-cooperative equilibrium.
7 Appendix A
We show that the eﬃcient equilibrium need not be achievable for some cost
parameters. Assume that cE =1+  and consider the limiting case with
  → 0. Assume further that N = {1,2,3}, with c1 =2 ,c2 = c3 =4 . N o t e
that c = 1. Note further that the maximum eﬀort by the enemy is yEmax =1 ,
as DE(1) = 1 = V . If the members of N play eﬃciently, the maximum θ =1






4 . Hence, the











24Now consider a leader who defaults, given θ = 1, and chooses y1 = 0. In this
case, N wins with a probability FE(1/2) = c(1
2)2 =1 /4, and, once the clan
wins the prize, the leader receives an expected contest payoﬀ in the intra-clan
contest that equals (1 −
c1
c2)=1 /2. Hence, the payoﬀ is zero if the leader
behaves according to the equilibrium candidate of Proposition 4, but receives
1/8 if he defaults. This counter example shows that the eﬃcient equilibrium
cannot always be implemented. 
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